Massive protests have been seen in Pakistan’s Balochistan over the past few weeks. Balochistan is a region with its own distinct cultural and historical identity that is now divided between three countries, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. The Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) had called for a ‘Baloch Raji Muchi’ (Baloch national gathering) in the port city of Gwadar to highlight human rights violations, exploitation of resources and the government’s inability to provide basic amenities to the people in the province. As a result, clashes broke out between protesters and security forces, resulting in deaths and detentions. The security forces’ crackdown and blockade of major routes in several cities and towns such as Gwadar, Hub, Mastung and Quetta resulted in a steep rise in the prices of essential commodities such as food, medicine and petrol.
Although there were reports that the BYC called off the protests in Gwadar after talks with the government, past experiences suggest that more protests could resume soon. For instance, last December, protesting custodial killings and fake encounters, Baloch protesters marched from Turbat to Islamabad, where the police cracked down violently on them. Following this, protests continued in various parts of Balochistan.
In a country with many restrictions on women’s rights, protests in Balochistan have seen active participation of women, reflecting deep resentment towards the violent tactics of the security forces. Women like Mehrang Baloch, who lost her father in custodial killings, are leading the protests.
Reason and cause
The recent protests are an important episode in Balochistan’s long history of political turmoil. In 1947, the Khan of Kalat declared the formation of an independent state in Balochistan. Following persistent pressure tactics by Pakistan’s leadership, the Khan of Kalat signed the document of accession in 1948. Interestingly, at the time of Pakistan’s independence, Gwadar was part of the Sultanate of Oman. After prolonged negotiations with Oman, Pakistan was able to purchase Gwadar in 1958. This history of independence, resistance and incorporation of territories through coercion defines Balochistan’s political direction.
Additionally, in 1955, various provinces and ethnic areas of West Pakistan were merged into a single province under the One Unit plan. This plan resulted in considerable centralization of power and negated the basic principles of federalism. After much protest, it was abolished in 1970, resulting in the emergence of provincial assemblies, including in Balochistan. However, this did not usher in an era of genuine federalism. Provincial governments were regularly dismissed, and Islamabad continued to have a significant say in the governance of the province. The lack of provincial autonomy fueled discontent in Balochistan, which often became the site of numerous revolts and protests.
Balochistan’s economic neglect has also contributed to discontent in the region. Balochistan, accounting for 44% of the country’s land area – containing significant mineral resources such as copper, gold, coal and natural gas – is one of the most backward regions in Pakistan. The exploitation of these resources has not brought concrete economic benefits to the local population. According to a 2018-19 UNDP report, Balochistan accounts for 4.5% of Pakistan’s GDP, 14% of the national road network and 4% of its national electricity consumption. Despite being a mineral-rich region with a long coastline, poor economic indicators have fuelled frustration in Balochistan against Islamabad’s policies. The region’s performance is also not satisfactory with respect to child, youth and labour development indicators.
There is a lot of resentment in Balochistan over the government’s counter-terrorism strategy. Security forces, as part of their counter-terrorism operations, reportedly resort to enforced disappearances, which means that the whereabouts of individuals detained/abducted by government authorities are unknown. Often, incidents of enforced disappearances end in extrajudicial killings and fake encounters. The government-formed Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances recorded around 2,752 cases. On the other hand, civil society groups such as Voice of Baloch Missing Persons argue that there were over 7,000 cases of disappearances between 2002 and 2024. Various human rights organisations have also highlighted incidents of enforced disappearances of Baloch people. However, the security forces’ attempts to use enforced disappearances to suppress Baloch nationalist sentiment have completely failed. Instead, enforced disappearances have deepened discontent in Balochistan, which will also have an impact on the wider region.
China’s role in the region
Today, China has emerged as a major player in Balochistan and has invested in mining, energy, airports and expressway projects as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The CPEC starts from Kashgar in China and runs through the entire length of Pakistan, ending in Gwadar. Due to its proximity to the Strait of Hormuz, a shipping route that witnesses substantial oil transportation, Gwadar has often been involved in geopolitical discussions, even during the Cold War.
A Chinese firm has taken a 40-year lease to Gwadar Port and is involved in its construction and operation. While Pakistani officials often insist that Gwadar will remain a commercial port, fears remain about the possible militarisation of the port. The presence of Chinese naval forces would enhance its ability to project power into the Persian Gulf and protect its energy supplies through the Strait of Hormuz. The possible militarisation of the port, fencing and other infrastructure developments have raised concerns among locals that they will lose access to large stretches of coastline, which will negatively impact their livelihoods. Additionally, the presence of Chinese trawlers close to Gwadar prompted protests from the local fishing community, who demanded an end to illegal fishing and the freedom to operate in the seas without restrictions.
Many in Balochistan believe that even a decade after the launch of CPEC, their people have not seen any tangible benefits.
Instead, there is growing concern that the province’s demographics are rapidly changing as non-locals come to Balochistan to work on infrastructure projects. Overall, CPEC has not addressed the perception of neglect among the Baloch people.
The way forward
Parallel to the women-led political movement protesting Islamabad’s policies, there is also an armed insurgency going on in Balochistan.
There has been a steady increase in attacks by Baloch insurgent groups on security forces, CPEC projects and other targets such as the Pakistan Stock Exchange in Karachi. The Pakistan government is responding to these incidents by stepping up its security strategy. Perhaps Pakistan’s establishment should listen to the voices demanding a prudent approach to address the challenges in Balochistan. Dawn said in its recent editorial: “Those in power should listen to the aggrieved voices of Balochistan with compassion and work to resolve the province’s burning issues, chief among which are missing persons and socio-economic inequalities.”
Furthermore, Islamabad’s approach to building some major infrastructure projects with external assistance and without the involvement of adequate local stakeholders has increased the grievances of the Baloch.
The conflict in Balochistan is indicative of the challenges Pakistan faces in building a nation-state based solely on religion. Movements based on ethnic identities not defined solely by religion have often, sometimes successfully, challenged Pakistan’s nation-building project.
To further complicate the challenges, Pakistan’s long periods of military rule interspersed with semi-democratic rule ensured that provinces rarely had the autonomy to participate in determining their own destiny.
Apart from Pakistan, experiences from other parts of the subcontinent, such as Sri Lanka and Myanmar, show that failure to address provincial aspirations results in political turmoil.
Sanjay Pulipaka is chairman of the Politea Research Foundation. Views expressed here are personal.